













Determinants of high-royalty contracts 
and the impact ofstronger protection 



















Hitotsubashi University Research Unit 
for Statistical Analysis in Social Sciences 
A 21st-Century COE Program 
 
Institute of Economic Research   
Hitotsubashi University 
Kunitachi, Tokyo, 186-8603 Japan 
http://hi-stat.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/   1
Determinants of high-royalty contracts and the impact of 
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Nagaoka, Sadao—Determinants of high-royalty contracts and the impact of stronger protection 
of intellectual property rights in Japan 
This paper first reviews how Japan has strengthened the protection of intellectual property 
rights (IPRs), focusing on the expansion of the patentable subject matter, the restriction of the 
possibility of compulsory licensing, stronger deterrence against infringement and the 
introduction of the doctrine of equivalents. Second, based on the statistical analysis of 
sector-level panel data, it shows that   
(1)  R&D intensity of domestic industry, trademark licensing, cross-licensing and, to a smaller 
degree, monopoly provisions are the significant determinants of the incidence of 
high-royalty contracts, and   
(2)  Stronger protection of intellectual property rights looks to have increased the incidence of 
high-royalty contracts in the latter part of 1990s in the Japanese industries for which patent 
is important for appropriability.   
JEL classification:  F 2 3 ,   O 3 4  
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1. Introduction 
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection in Japan has been significantly strengthened since 
the mid-1990s. This policy shift has certainly reflected international developments, in particular, 
the IPRs policy dialogue between the Japanese and the U.S. governments in the framework of 
the Structural Impediments Initiative that culminated in the agreement in 1994, and the Trade 
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement in 1995. It also reflected the recognition 
by the Japanese policy makers of the increasing importance of intellectual property in the 
economy in which investments in intangibles had become very important. 
This paper reviews such policy changes in Japan and attempts to evaluate their impact, 
focusing on the incidence of the high-royalty technology import contracts in Japan. More 
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specifically, I examine whether the fraction of high royalty contracts has increased more in those 
sectors where patents play an important role in appropriating the return from R&D. In addition, I 
also inquire how this fraction is related to basic contract characteristics such as exclusive rights, 
cross licensing provisions, and the structure of IPRs specified in the contracts. Although these are 
straightforward questions to ask, they are still important ones, given that empirical studies of the 
determinants of licensing contracts are scarce.
1  
In what follows, Section 2 reviews Japanese policy, focusing on the expansion of 
patentable subject matter, restriction of the possibility of compulsory licensing, stronger 
deterrence against infringement and the introduction of the doctrine of equivalents. Section 3 
provides a brief overview of the major features of technology import contracts in Japan. Section 
4 provides an analytical framework, and Section 5 provides the framework for the empirical 
analysis. Section 6 provides empirical results, and Section 7 concludes and discusses the 
implications.  
2. Stronger intellectual property rights protection in Japan 
2.1. Three driving forces for the changes 
The Japanese government has significantly strengthened the protection of intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) since the early 1990s. The first major driving force for such changes was the TRIPs 
agreement in 1995. It requires member countries, among others, to make patent protection 
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, with only 
a few specified exceptions and to make the term of protection available for not less than a period 
of twenty years counted from the filing date.   
                                                      
1 Some important empirical studies of licensing include: Taylor and Silberston (1973), Caves, Crookell 
and Killing (1983), Davidson and McFeridge (1984), Anand and Khanna (2000) and Arora, Fosfuri and 
Gambardella ( 2001).   3
The second driving force was the U.S.-Japan agreement in 1994, under which both 
governments agreed to undertake three measures, respectively. The Japanese government 
switched to the post-grant opposition system from the pre-grant opposition system in 1994, and 
then unified the opposition system with the patent validity examination system in 2004. It also 
pledged not to invoke compulsory licensing to resolve the blocking relationship (Article 92) 
unless it is for the purpose of correcting anticompetitive conduct or for the public or 
non-commercial use (see the following subsection for more details). Furthermore, it reformed the 
early examination system to allow an applicant with an application to a foreign patent office to 
enjoy a fast track in examination.
2 These measures are applicable to domestic as well as to all 
foreign patent applicants, due to the MFN requirement of the TRIPS. 
  The third driving force was the domestic reform initiative in recognition by the Japanese 
policy makers of the increasing importance of the intellectual property system in the economy in 
which investments in intangibles have become important. Table 1 shows the share of investments 
in intangible and tangible assets by major Japanese corporations in 2000 FY on the 
non-consolidated basis. R&D investment overwhelms plant and equipment investment in the 
pharmaceutical industry as well as in the game and telecommunications industry. Even in the 
automobile industry, R&D investment is significantly larger than investment in plant and 
equipment on the non-consolidated basis. Furthermore, advertisement investment is as important 
as plant and equipment investment in the pharmaceutical and game industry. 
                   ( T a b l e   1 )  
                                                      
2  The U.S. government pledged the following three measures: introduction of an early disclosure system 
of patent application, introduction of a re-examination system, and continued forbearing using 
compulsory  licensing.     4
2. 2 Expansion of the patentable subject matter 
One of the major changes in the scope of patent protection in the 1990s was the patentability of 
computer programs. Although the issue of whether an algorithm or mathematical formula can be 
patented was also important in the United States, the issue there was resolved in early 1980s in 
favor of its patentability.
3 A major constraint in Japan was that the patent law defines an 
invention eligible for patent as a “technical idea utilizing natural laws.”
4 Reflecting this 
qualification, a computer program was not patentable until 1993, unless it was combined with 
hardware. By itself, it became patentable in 1997, when recorded in a computer-readable storage 
medium. It became fully patentable in 2000 (affirmed in 2002 patent law amendment, although 
the legal definition of a patent was not modified). 
  The increasing patentability of software seems to have been reflected in the increasing 
proportion of patent rights incorporated in the contracts of technology imports of Japanese firms. 
According to Figure 1, only less than 1% of the contracts specified patent rights in software 
licenses, compared to more than 60% for the hardware technology licenses in 1990. The 
proportion of contracts with patents in software licenses increased significantly in the 1990s. It 
reached 22.6% of the contracts in 1998.   
                  ( F i g u r e   1 )  
2.3 Restriction of the possibility of compulsory licensing 
Based on the U.S.-Japan Agreement in 1994, the Japanese Government made it clear that it 
would not require compulsory licensing in order to resolve the blocking relationship (based on 
Article 92), unless it was for the purpose of correcting anticompetitive conduct or for public or 
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4 Merges (1996) suggests that weak copyright and patent protection of software in Japan retarded the 
development of the prepackaged software industry in Japan, since the protection of IPR by contractual 
means is not effective for prepackaged software, unlike custom software.   5
non-commercial use.
5 Such a blocking relationship can occur for example between a basic 
patent and an improvement patent, and is usually settled privately though unilateral or cross 
license. However, if a licensor refuses to give a license or demands a large royalty, a potential 
licensee might ask the government to intervene under Article 92. Although there was not a single 
case of the government actually ordering a compulsory license, there were at least 23 
applications that were later privately settled. Many of these applications were made by 
pharmaceutical companies. 
The threat of a government intervention itself has the effect of reducing the royalty rate 
on the blocking patent. Thus, the commitment by the Government not to intervene would have 
the effect of increasing the royalty rate. Figure 2 shows the royalty payments for patent licensing 
and the R&D investments of major Japanese pharmaceutical firms, both relative to sales, for the 
1980s and 1990s. While the R&D sales ratio has continued to rise, the ratio of patent royalty to 
sales declined until the middle of the 1990s and thereafter has risen. The ratio of royalty payment 
to R&D also started to rise, reversing the downward trend from the mid-1990s. The reversal of 
trend indicates a possibility that stronger protection of patents in Japan, including the restriction 
of the possibility of compulsory licensing, has affected the royalty rate. 
          ( F i g u r e   2 )  
2.4 Stronger deterrence against infringement 
Deterrence against infringement has also been significantly strengthened by the reform of the 
private damage system as well as by stronger criminal sanctions. The damage awarded in the 
case of infringement used to be low in Japan. In addition to the difficulty in proving the causal 
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the Right Holder), which allows more extensive interventions, except in the case of semi-conductor 
technology.      6
link between infringement and lost profit, the opportunity cost was not used in estimating the lost 
profit. The patentee would incur only the incremental cost to achieve the output that he would be 
able to produce if there were no competing entry infringing his patent. Despite this, average cost 
was used in determining the lost profit due to such infringement, significantly underestimating 
the damage. The court rulings, however, have begun to adopt the concept of opportunity cost 
since the middle of 1990s.
6  
A similar problem existed in the determination of royalty as damage. When the causality 
between infringement and damage is not proven, the damage is estimated based on the royalty. 
The basis of such royalty, however, used to be a reference rate such as the royalty rate of a 
state-owned patent, partly because the patent law provision on damage (Article 102) used to 
characterize it as “the value to be ordinarily received.” Thus, it was not based upon the 
hypothetical ex-ante royalty negotiation between the two parties as in the United States, which 
could reflect the profit made by the infringing firm.   
The patent law was revised in 1988. The amendment introduced a new provision that 
allows the patentee to presume the amount of damages due to infringement, based on the sales 
made by the infringer and on the profit rate of the patentee. It also dropped the term “usual” in its 
stipulation of the royalty damage. Furthermore, it strengthened the criminal sanctions. Similar 
amendments with a view to strengthening deterrence were introduced for the copyright law and 
for the law on fair competition that protects know-how.   
  The effect of stronger enforcement looks to be clearly observable in the decline of the 
“piracy” rate of business software. Figure 3 shows the business software “piracy” rates in seven 
major industrialized countries as estimated by the Business Software Alliance. The “piracy” rate 
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by Tokyo Local Court, involving the infringement of copyright of a computer program.     7
in the Japan was among the highest in 1994, together with that of Italy, more than twice the U.S. 
rate. However, Japan’s rate declined significantly over the following eight years, reaching a 
similar level as that of Germany in 2002.   
              ( F i g u r e   3 )  
2.5 Introduction of the doctrine of equivalents 
Another important development was the affirmation of the “doctrine of equivalents” by the 
Supreme Court in 1998. The strength of patent protection critically depends on how broadly the 
court recognizes equivalence, since it determines how much a firm has to spend to invent around 
an existing patent. The Supreme Court ruled, among other things, that “equivalence” should be 
determined based on the technologies available when the infringement takes place, not when the 
patent is granted. Thus, the modifications that are obvious given the technologies available at the 
time of infringement keep equivalence. After this ruling, 140 litigations involving the issue of 
equivalence were initiated from 1998 to 2003, and equivalence was recognized by the courts in 
15 cases in this period. 
3. Brief overview of the licensing contracts for technology import 
In the rest of this paper, I analyze whether we can detect the effect of stronger protection of IPRs 
in Japan on the price of technology, in particular, on the price of imported technology. Since we 
use industry-level data, we can analyze only the aggregate characteristics of licensing contracts, 
preventing us from analyzing the effects of firm-level factors on royalty terms. On the other hand, 
the survey used is very comprehensive, based on a compulsory reporting system. In addition, it 
has a long time horizon, so that we can use panel estimation in investigating the above questions 
(See Table A-1 in the appendix for details).   8
  The number of technology import contracts was 2,000-3,000 annually, during the period 
from 1971 to 1998 (see Figure 4). The number of contracts dropped sharply in 1998, due to 
reduction in the scope of the reporting requirements.
7  There has been a significant change in the 
composition of imported technologies. Most importantly, the share of software technology has 
increased significantly over time. It accounted for less than 10% in 1981, but for about a half in 
the 1990s. The change in the aggregate picture of contract characteristics over time has also been 
closely related to this structural change. 
                         ( F i g u r e   4 )  
  Let us summarize the changes in contract characteristics in both price and non-price 
terms over the last two decades. Table 2 shows two averages: the simple average of all contracts 
in the columns under group I, and the average of the values of 48 industries in the columns under 
group II. The latter average controls the structural change of industry in terms of the number of 
contracts due to its fixed weight. For the first average, 94.5% of the contracts involve financial 
payments, and 62.2% have royalty provisions. Some 26.5% of the royalty contracts have high 
royalty rates (8% or more of sales) and 61.3% have initial payment provisions in the most recent 
period.  
                       ( T a b l e   2 )  
The average price of imported technology has increased during these two decades, 
although its extent is not large once we control for the change in the composition of imported 
technologies. The share of high royalty contracts increased significantly from 13.4% in 1981-84 
to 26.5% in 1995-98. However, the increase is much less substantial, once we control for 
structural change. It increased only from 13.4% in 1981-84 to 14.8% in 1995-98, according to 
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the second average. The share of the contracts with initial payments and the share of the 
contracts with financial payments also increased from 57.6% to 60.4% and from 93.3% to 95.9%, 
respectively, according to the second average.   
As for non-price conditions (exclusive territorial provisions (or monopoly provisions), 
and cross-licensing), the share of the contracts with monopoly rights declined from 51.0% in 
1981-1984 to 29.4% in the most recent period in the total average, and declined from 52.0% to 
41.6% according to the second average. Cross-licensing became more prevalent only according 
to the second average, from 4.4% to 5.6%.     
Table 3 shows the structure of intellectual property rights (IPRs) specified in the licensing 
contracts over the last two decades. Know-how is most frequently specified in the contracts. 
Close to 50% of the contracts specified only know-how in these periods. More than 70% of the 
contracts specified know-how as one of the IPRs in 1995-98. Although it is often pointed out that 
know-how is difficult to trade due to information asymmetry,
8  it is an important part of licensing. 
Trademarks have become more often specified. The frequency of contracts with only trademarks 
increased significantly from 5.9% in 1981-84 to 19.4% in 1995-98. Some 32.4% of the contracts 
covered trademarks in 1995-98. Patents have become less specified according to the first average. 
The frequency of contracts with only patents declined from 11.7 % in 1981-84 to 9.0% in 
1995-98. However, this is entirely due to the structural change in the composition of imported 
technologies, since no decline is recorded based in the second average. Some 24.0 % of the 
contracts specified patents in the 1995-98 period.   
  (Table  3) 
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4. Theoretical framework   
The theoretical framework for the determination of royalty in licensing contracts is as follows. A 
licensor (X) and a licensee (Y) negotiate a licensing contract based on the Nash bargaining 
framework. We first consider the case of a bilateral monopoly and later discuss the extension. We 
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  The Nash bargaining solution gives the following gain to the licensor: 
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where θ(0< θ<1) represents the bargaining power of the licensor. Thus, the licensee has to pay 
the following royalty R to the licensor: 
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If we assume that the licensee Y does not use its technology in the market of the licensor X, this 
can be simplified into the following: 




D R Π − Π =θ                                             (2) 
The payment is high when the licensee Y can realize high profit using the licensed technology (a 
higher
Y
D Π ), and when he can realize only low profit without licensing (a lower
Y
M Π ).  
  The profit that Y can realize using the licensed technology depends on the possibility of 
competition from domestic imitation. For simplicity, we assume that Y cannot make a positive 
profit if imitation takes place, the probability of which is given by γ. If we denote the profit of Y 
with no competition from imitation by
Y
N D, Π , we have   11
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In case Y cannot obtain a license, he can still realize some profit by doing his own R&D. In 
particular, it is assumed that   
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where 
X RD   is the amount of R&D expenditure, which X spends to invent around that 
technology. The parameters δ and α indicate the difficulty of inventing- around. Combining the 
above three equations, we have 
} ) 1 ( { ,
X Y
N D RD R α γ δ θ + Π − =               (5) 
Equation (5) suggests the following four determinants of the price of technology (R). 
First,  R is high when the licensed technology enables the licensee to realize high profit, in 
particular, when the technology is advanced relative to prevailing technology, the technology 
licensed is comprehensive or highly developed so that its commercialization does not need a 
large additional expenditure. Second, if the technology to be licensed requires a large R&D 
expenditure for being invented around, the royalty rate would be high.   
Third, R would increase with stronger IPR protection, due to smaller vertical competition 
for the licensor from the licensee as well as to smaller horizontal competition for the licensee. 
Since stronger protection of IPRs makes inventing-around difficult and expensive (i.e., δ and α 
are large), it shifts the threat point in favor of a licensor.
9  In addition, it makes imitation more 
difficult (γ is low), so that the infringement by a third party is reduced. Both of these changes 
increase the payment for the technology. 
Fourthly, it depends on the bargaining power of the licensor. If ex-ante competition 
                                                      
9  However, there is a theoretical possibility that stronger protection of IPRs shifts the threat point in favor 
of a licensee. As discussed by Schankerman and Scotchmer (1999), larger damage for infringement can 
induce a licensee to switch its conduct from the strategy of infringement (and payment of damage) to that 
of non-infringement when it faces refusal of license.   12
among licensees is strong so that the entire bargaining surplus belongs to a licensor, we have 
1 = θ  so  that 
X Y
N D RD R α γ δ + Π − = , ) 1 (                ( 6 )  
A good indicator of ex-ante competition is exclusivity provision, since, if there is strong ex-ante 
competition among licensees, a licensee would not be willing to invest in commercializing the 
technology unless he were guaranteed by a licensor for an exclusive entry. Thus, we would 
expect that the royalty rate would be high when the licensing contract has an exclusivity 
provision.  
If the effect of competition among licensors is so strong that the entire bargaining surplus 
belongs to a licensee due to the competition among licensors with identical technology, we have 
the following: 
0 = R                  ( 7 )  
In this case, the exogenous changes affecting the ex-post profits of a licensee, including the level 
of protection of intellectual property rights, do not affect the price of technology. In reality, 
however, it is unlikely that competition among licensors is so severe, since patent protection 
restricts the possibility that two firms have exactly the same technology. 
  In the empirical analysis, we depend on the data of royalty rates, which are given in terms 
of the ratio relative to the sales of the licensee (
Y
D S ). If we assume that all payments are made by 
a running royalty and that it does not affect the sales of a licensee,
10 we obtain the following 
expression for the royalty rate:   
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10 Such would be the case if the licensee faces Bertrand competition in the product market. In this case 
his price is entirely determined by the product quality or cost of the competitor with the second-best 
technology.    13
One noteworthy point is that the reduced possibility of third party infringement (lower γ) can 
reduce the royalty rate due to the expansion of sales (
Y
D S ), if the second term in the bracket is 
important. This reflects that a part of the payment for technology depends on the threat point, so 
that it declines relative to the realized sales when the latter increases. 
5. Framework of estimation 
We postulate the following specification in order to examine how the royalty rates are related to 
the contract characteristics, as suggested by the above theoretical model, based on industry-level 
panel data:   
t , i 6 t , i 5 t , i 4 t , i 3 t , i 2 t , i 1 t , i ) cr ( ) kh ( ) pat ( ) br ( ) monopoly ( ) rds ( ) price ( β β β β β β α + + + + + + =
t i i t i t i propd initial , , 8 , 7 ) ( ) ( ε δ η β β + + + + + ｔ                (9) 
In the above specification, i denotes the sector and t the time period. The variable  i η  is  industry 
fixed effects. We introduce 31 industry dummies to control industry-level missing variables, 
which are fixed over time and may cover research opportunities, demand growth and market 
structure. For example, we expect that a sector with rich research opportunities would have high 
level of R&D as well as high royalty rates, so that we may find spurious correlations between the 
two variables unless we control for industry fixed effects. We divide the 20 year time period into 
the following four periods: 1981 to 1984; ; 1985, 1986 and 1989; 1990 to 1994; and 1995 to 
1998. We introduce time dummies  t δ (Time2, Time3, Time4), which will absorb the common 
effect of the stronger intellectual rights protection on royalty rates, thus making it more difficult 
to identify the effect of stronger IPR policy. But this can control for the effects of 
macroeconomic changes on royalty rates. Finally  t i, ε   is a random term. 
The dependent variable (price)i,t  is the price of technology. We use the share of the   14
licensing contracts with the royalty rate of 8% or more in all royalty based contracts (price), to 
measure the price level of imported technology. The variance of this variable is likely to be 
heterogeneous, given the difference in the number of contracts with royalty payments across 
sectors. We use GLS estimation to take this into account. We also limit our sample to those 
industries with ten or more licensing contracts with royalty payments in each period (we have 39 
sectors satisfying this condition out of 48 sectors (see Table A-2), and the sample is further 
limited to 32 sectors, due to the availability of R&D data. Table A-3 in the appendix provides 
summary statistics. 
The first independent variable (rds)i,t is the R&D intensity of domestic industry: the R&D 
expenditure of each industry divided by its sales in each period. It aims at capturing the 
profitability of commercializing imported technology as well as the cost of R&D necessary for a 
licensee to invent around the technology in case licensing does not materialize. As suggested by 
equations (6) and (8), it would positively affect the royalty rates.   
The second independent variable (monopoly)i,t is the share of the contracts with exclusive 
right. The presence of the exclusivity provision shows the existence of ex-ante competition 
among licensees, as explained above. It would positively affect royalty since it implies a stronger 
bargaining power of a licensor.
11 The third, fourth and fifth independent variables indicate the 
structure of intellectual property rights (IPRs) specified in contracts. The variables br, pat and kh, 
respectively, denote the share of the contracts with trade-mark, patents and know-how. The 
coefficient of each variable shows the marginal value of each IPR, so that it should be positive.   
The sixth independent variable (cr)i,t is the share of the contracts with a cross licensing 
provision. Higher incidence of cross-licensing in the context of technology import implies that 
                                                      
11 The exclusivity provision may also indicate the quality of technology, since a licensor is more 
concerned with preventing competition among licensees when the technology is dominant over the 
prevailing technology.     15
more payment is made in kind (i.e., by technology), and therefore the smaller need for paying a 
high royalty. However, it may also indicate higher quality of the technology introduced in the 
sector, since the patentee of a pioneer patent often requires the grant-back of its derivative 
technologies. The seventh independent variable (initial)i,t is the share of the contracts with initial 
payment. The total payment for technology consists of royalty payments and initial payments. 
The variable initial controls for the substitutability between initial payments and royalty 
payments. 
 The last independent variable (propd)i,t is a dummy variable for the period from 1994 
to 1998, representing the effect of the stronger IPR policy is Japan since the mid-1990s. We 
evaluate whether the incidence of high royalty contracts increased in 1994-1998 in a manner 
consistent with the impact of stronger IPRs. There are two important sources for the variation of 
the effects of stronger IPR across sectors: the effectiveness of IPR on the appropriability of R&D 
and the territorial restriction stipulated in the licensing contracts with respect to the Japanese 
market. As for the indicator of the contribution of IPRs to appropriability, we use two variables. 
One indicator (aprd) is the appropriability indicator of patent protection (apr), which is based on 
the survey results of Goto and Nagata (1996),
12  multiplied by the time dummy variable (Time4). 
We expect that stronger IPR protection would affect more the sector for which the contribution 
of a patent to the appropriability of R&D is stronger. The second indicator (rdsd) is the R&D 
intensity of each sector (rds multiplied by the time dummy (Time4)). Stronger protection of IPR 
(larger α) has a larger effect on the royalty in R&D intensive industry as shown in equations (6) 
and (8).   
The effects of stronger IPR protection would also depend upon the territorial scope of 
                                                      
12 See the appendix for further explanation. Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) present the results of the 
most recent survey for the U.S. industry.   16
licensing contracts. If licensing covers only the Japanese market, its term is strongly influenced 
by the IPR protection in Japan. The variable we use is the average percentage of licensing 
contracts with its territorial scope restricted to Japan from 1990 to 1991 (mrkj, see Table A-2 in 
the Appendix for the variation of this variable across sectors), multiplied by the time dummy 
variable, i.e., mrkd= mrkj *Time4. Since the appropriability (or R&D intensity) indicator and the 
focus of the territorial scope can affect the royalty rate in a multiplicative manner, we also use 
the following variables ( 4 time mrkj apr aprmrkd × × = and 4 time mrkj rds rdsmrkd × × = ).  
6. Estimation results 
Table 4 shows nine estimation results. Estimation 1 is the benchmark estimation with no 
pro-patent dummies. Estimations 2 to 6 use the appropriability indicator of patent (apr) to 
capture the impact of stronger IPR policy of Japan in late 1990s. We drop the variable (initial) in 
estimation 5 in order to check the robustness of the estimation results with respect to treating that 
variable as one component of the random error. We drop both industry and time dummies in 
estimation 6 to assess the industry fixed effects. Estimations 7 to 9 use the R&D intensity (rds) 
instead of the appropriability indicator of patent (that is, we expect that the coefficient of rds 
increased from 1994 to 1998 due to the policy effect). The appropriability and the territorial 
restriction variables affect royalty in a multiplicative manner in the specification for estimations 
2 and 7, while they do so in an additive manner for estimations 3 and 8. On the other hand only 
the appropriability variable affects royalty in the specification for estimations 4 and 9. Our 
preferred estimation is estimation 2 that has the largest likelihood. The tables omit reporting the 
e s t i m a t e d   c o e f f i c i e n t s   o f   t h e   i n d u s t r y   d u m m i e s   a n d   t i m e   d u m m i e s .                      
     ( T a b l e   4 )   
R&D intensity (rds) has a positive and highly significant coefficient at the 1% level in all   17
estimations. Thus, higher R&D intensity over time has resulted in higher incidence of 
high-royalty contracts, fully consistent with our expectation. The share of exclusive rights 
(monopoly) also has a positive coefficient in all estimations, consistent with the idea that 
exclusivity increases royalty rate. Its significance, however, is not stable across estimations. It is 
significant at the 5% level in our preferred estimation 2, and it becomes highly significant (1% 
level) when we drop the variable initial (estimation 5), due to a relatively high correlation 
between the two variables (see Table A-3). The declining incidence of monopoly rights over time 
should have affected negatively the incidence of high-royalty contracts.   
As for the impact of IPRs, the brand variable (br) has the largest and most significant 
coefficient. It is significant at 1% level in all estimations based on the appropriability indicator of 
patents, except for estimation 6. The significant increase in the incidence of trademark licensing 
over time should have significantly increased the incidence of high-royalty contracts. The other 
IPR variables (pat and know-how) also have positive coefficients, except for estimation 6. The 
patent variable has a significant coefficient at the 5% level in our preferred estimation 2. The 
finding that the expansion of trademarks is associated with the most significant increase in the 
incidence of high royalty contracts may not be surprising, given that a licensing contract with 
trademarks would enable a licensee to market a distinctive product with an internationally 
recognized brand, which would in turn indicate that the technology and the other assets licensed 
are comprehensive.   
The comparison of estimations 2 and 6 demonstrates the importance of controlling for 
industry fixed effects to avoid estimation bias. In estimation 6 the patent variable has a 
significantly negative coefficient and the variable initial has a positive (although not significant) 
coefficient. Both of these results are likely due to the correlation between missing variables and 
the error term. For an example, the negative coefficient of a patent variable is driven by the fact   18
that the royalty rate is high in the computer industry where patents used to be unimportant. 
The cross-license variable (cr) has a significant and positive sign in all estimations, 
excluding estimation 6. This finding suggests that this variable indicates the quality change of a 
licensed technology more than the change of the payment in kind. The incidence of a 
cross-licensing provision, therefore, helps us to control the change in the quality of the 
technology in a sector over time. The initial variable has a negative coefficient, as expected. Its 
exclusion does not significantly affect the estimation results, as shown in estimation 5.   
All estimations, excluding estimation 9, show that the appropriability variable in 
1995-98 has a positive and significant coefficient (1% or 5% level), whether in a multiplicative 
manner or in an additive manner with the territorial focus variable of a contract. It is significant 
at the 1% level in all estimations based on the appropriability indicator of a patent. That is, high 
royalty contracts increased significantly more in the industries for which IPRs are important. In 
the additive specification (estimation 3 and 8), the territorial focus variable has a positive 
coefficient but is significant only in estimation 8. The comparison between estimations 2 and 4 
(or between estimations 7 and 9) shows that the appropriability variable multiplied by the 
territorial focus variable (aprmrkd or rdsmrkd) has a slightly better explanatory power than the 
appropriability variable alone (aprd or rdsd). Thus, we have some evidence that the 
appropriability role of IPRs and the territorial restriction in the Japanese market specified in the 
contracts affect royalty in a multiplicative manner. These results support the view that the 
increase in high-royalty contracts in the latter part of the 1990s reflected the impact of stronger 
IPR policy in Japan.   
7 Conclusions 
We first reviewed the Japanese policy for stronger IPRs protection in the 1990s, focusing on the 
expansion of the patentable subject matter, restriction of the possibility of compulsory licensing,   19
stronger deterrence against infringement, and the introduction of the doctrine of equivalents. It 
was concluded that there have been substantive changes in Japan’s IPR policies. We then 
evaluated econometrically how stronger protection of IPRs in Japan had affected the incidence of 
high-royalty technology import contracts in the 1980s and 1990s.   
Our econometric estimation based on sector-level panel data suggested that, controlling for 
industry fixed effects and period specific effects, higher R&D intensity of domestic industry, 
trademark licensing and cross-licensing are accompanied with more high royalty contracts. 
Exclusivity also tends to increase the incidence of high-royalty contracts. A stronger effect of 
trademark licensing than patent and know-how licensing suggests that trademark licensing 
implies a larger commitment of a licensor. A positive effect of cross-licensing seems to suggest 
that the higher frequency of cross-licensing contracts indicates licensing of higher quality 
technology.  
Our estimations also suggest that, controlling for these factors, the share of high royalty 
contracts increased significantly in the latter part of 1990s in the industries for which IPRs are 
important for appropriability. There is also some evidence showing that this effect is stronger in 
sectors in which the restriction of sales territory to Japan is frequently imposed in the contracts. 
The econometric results thus support the view that Japan has significantly strengthened its IPR 
protection. The results highlight the importance of the differential impacts of IPR policy 
according to the effect of IPRs on appropriability.   
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Appendix 1—Data Sources 
The licensing contracts data set is from the annual reports on the status of technology imports 
and technology-related imports compiled by the Science and Technology Agency (now by the 
National Institute for Science and Technology Policy). The tables with detailed industrial 
classification (39 industries) are available for 1981 to 1998, except for 1987 and 1988. The 
agency has compiled this report based on compulsory reporting requirements by the “Foreign 
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law” (hereinafter referred to as the “Foreign Exchange 
Control Law”). 
  The R&D data are from the National Survey of Research and Development by the 
Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications. Since the data 
published from this survey are less aggregated than the license data in terms of industrial 
classification, the matching is imperfect in general machinery and electrical/electronics 
machinery.  
  We use the survey results on the contribution of patents in appropriating the return from 
R&D by Japanese industries (Goto and Nagata (1996)) as an indicator of appropriability based 
on patent (apr). For six sectors which the survey did not cover, we estimated the indicators based 
on the R&D intensity in these sectors. 
 Table 1 
Investments in tangible assets vs. in intangible assets (2000FY)
Industry  Firm  R&D (%)  Advertisement (%)  Plant & Equipment (%)
 Total investment
(Billion Yen)
 Takeda  70.10%  16.10%  13.80%  113.3
 Eisai  75.90%  12.40%  11.70%  61.3
 NTT  80.70%  1.30%  18.10%  255.7
 Square  74.30%  11.80%  13.80%  19.6
 Toshiba  64.00%  4.20%  31.80%  436.8
 Fujitsu  67.30%  4.80%  27.90%  488.6
 Toyota  55.80%  12.40%  31.80%  767.3
 Mazda  49.90%  15.80%  34.30%  137.4
Note 1. Total Investments=R&D+Advertisements+Plant&Equipment Investments







81-84 85,86,89 90-94 95-98 81-84 85,86,89 90-94 95-98
Contracts with financial
payment
94.0 94.5 94.2 94.5 93.3 92.6 93.9 95.9
Royalty contracts 68.7 50.3 56.0 62.2 73.3 63.4 70.1 71.9
High royalty contracts
1) 13.4 14.9 23.7 26.5 13.4 11.0 17.5 14.8
Initial payments 58.2 70.6 69.6 61.3 57.6 66.1 63.2 60.4
Monopoly rights 51.0 44.1 36.7 29.4 52.0 48.7 45.8 41.6
Coss license 4.0 3.5 2.7 4.1 4.4 4.7 4.1 5.6
II. Average of 48 industry averages
Note 1.  % of high royalty contracts are with respect to the royalty contracts, not with respect to all contracts.
price
non-price
The proportion in the contracts (%)
I: Average of all contracts
Contract characteristics over timeTable 3
81-84 85,86,89 90-94 95-98 81-84 85,86,89 90-94 95-98
Only patents 11.71% 10.38% 8.15% 9.01% 14.35% 15.50% 12.46% 15.42%
With patents 36.47% 33.89% 24.30% 23.96% 41.08% 44.04% 44.23% 43.06%
Only trademark 5.90% 9.01% 12.01% 19.44% 6.80% 11.25% 19.95% 17.69%
With trademark 24.20% 21.49% 21.01% 32.39% 23.61% 25.87% 31.04% 38.51%
Only knowhow 48.78% 52.84% 59.20% 48.71% 41.66% 36.20% 32.09% 28.96%
With knowhow 69.34% 73.05% 90.04% 70.97% 72.42% 73.06% 74.02% 60.36%
I: Average of all contracts II. Simple average of  industry values  The proportion in the contracts
(%)
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89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
FY
%
Frequency of patents in the license of
hardware technology
Frequency of patents in software
license
Note.  Hardware technology excludes software and  trademark.




























































































Proft over sales (%)
R&D sales ration (%)
 Royalty payment for patent
over sales (1/1000)
Roalty for patent over R&D (%)
Note.  Based on the data of four companies (Takeda, Sankyo, Sinonogi and Fujisawa). The figure excludes Shionogi for 1979
and 1980.















































4PGUXBSFIndustry composition of technology import contracts (%)
81-84 85,86,89 90-94 94-98
Total number of contracts 8,895 7,695 15,800 11,258
Clothing and textile products 11.7% 8.0% 5.3% 12.6%
Drugs and medicines 3.2% 3.9% 3.3% 2.8%
Other  chemicals 5.8% 5.0% 2.8% 2.1%
General machinery and tools 18.8% 12.6% 8.0% 7.3%
Transportation equipment 3.7% 3.9% 2.1% 1.8%
Computers 17.4% 32.9% 53.0% 46.7%
Other  electric/electronics machinery 11.7% 11.8% 11.6% 13.4%
Precision machinery 2.9% 2.5% 2.3% 1.7%
Others 24.8% 19.5% 11.7% 11.6%
Table A-1Table A-2  











price notfree initial mrkj rds
4 Construction 8.6 100.0 66.3 88.1% 0.48 **
11 Food and tobacco 4.8 89.3 41.2 81.7% 0.87 *
12 Textiles 17.0 96.6 28.3 78.2% 1.50 *
14 Outer garments 8.9 98.6 27.0 82.3% 1.50 **
15 Other clothing textile products 14.1 99.2 11.8 96.8% 1.50 **
16
Sawing/planing mill products, wood products and
furniture 5.2 96.8 46.8 85.0%
17 Pulp and paper 17.6 93.8 53.0 81.3% 0.79 *
22 Industrial organic chemicals 5.2 90.1 74.7 42.5% 3.50 *
24 Oil & fat products, soaps, etc. 10.6 91.6 51.0 77.8% 3.76 *
25 Drugs and medicines 24.1 87.6 72.4 56.5% 7.35 *
26 Other  chemicals 16.0 86.2 49.4 60.7% 4.14 *
31 Rubber products 13.3 94.1 42.4 40.0% 3.03 *
32 Tanned leather, leather products and fur skins 15.8 99.2 16.8 90.4%
33 Ceramics 14.4 93.6 68.1 50.0% 2.43 *
35 Non-ferrous metals and products 7.9 89.1 78.7 43.8% 1.98 *
36 Fabricated metal products 8.4 95.6 65.1 49.3% 1.44 *
41 Boilers and engines 5.3 94.3 89.7 87.0% 2.92 *
42
Agricultural, construction and mining machinery and
equipment 8.6 98.7 64.0 25.0% 2.92 *
43 Metal working machinery 6.4 95.6 70.8 43.1% 2.92 *
45 Special industrial machinery 17.1 97.2 65.7 32.0% 2.92 *
47 Pumps, compressors and blowers 5.4 97.1 64.5 33.3% 2.92 *
48 Prime mover 2.3 95.8 61.2 24.2% 2.92 *
49 Chemical machinery and equipment 13.2 98.2 76.1 55.9% 2.92 *
50 Other  general industry machinery 9.5 99.0 75.8 42.9% 2.92 *
51 Other  machinery 11.6 92.8 72.4 36.2% 2.92 **
52 Transportation equipment 12.1 96.7 72.1 52.9% 3.23 *
53 Precision machinery 25.0 94.1 58.6 43.4% 4.99 *
61
Electricity generation, transmission & distribution
equipment and industrial electrical machinery,
equipment & supplies
12.6 93.1 70.6 37.8% 5.21 *
64 Wired and radio communication equipment 9.1 92.2 82.9 15.2% 5.61 *
65
Radio & television receivers and electric audio
equipment 3.0 90.2 63.1 8.3% 5.61 *
68 Computers 62.8 95.7 78.2 71.9% 5.61 *
69 Other  electronic equipment 10.5 92.9 76.7 10.7% 5.61 **
70 Electronic parts and devices 8.0 88.9 75.3 12.5% 5.61 *
71 Other  electric machinery 3.7 94.0 78.8 17.6% 5.61 **
81 Precious metal products, costume jewelry, etc. 25.9 94.0 16.8 68.2%
82 Leisure activity equipment 19.2 93.4 40.6 66.7%
83 Plastic products 5.7 89.7 65.9 52.2%
84 Manufacturing industries not classified elsewhere 27.9 94.8 44.3 88.2%
90 Other industries 12.6 96.8 62.8 100.0%
Note 2. Appropriability index is estimated based on the R&D intensity for the sectors with **.
Note 1. The proportion of the contracts with the territorial restriction to Japan (mrkj) is based on the
contracts in 90 and 91.
Code Industry sampleTable A-3  
Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max price rds monopoly br pat kh cr initial aprd mrkd aprmrkd
price 128 12.40 11.96 0 71.1 1
rds 128 3.36 1.79 0.43 8.28 0.252 1
monopoly 128 47.35 22.60 2.1 93.9 -0.026 -0.460 1
br 128 19.27 20.34 0.47 96.3 0.079 -0.288 0.286 1
pat 128 42.61 22.32 0.2 90.8 -0.301 0.501 -0.407 -0.442 1
kh 128 73.59 20.54 4.8 100 0.001 -0.047 0.066 -0.760 0.096 1
cr 128 4.96 5.15 0 26.5 -0.103 0.341 -0.524 -0.321 0.336 -0.020 1
initial 128 63.30 19.75 3.4 92.7 -0.044 0.427 -0.485 -0.771 0.528 0.604 0.355 1
aprd 32 30.07 6.89 18.44 54.61 0.507 0.580 0.093 -0.220 0.138 0.161 0.071 0.212 1
mrkd 32 0.49 0.25 0.08 0.97 0.214 -0.571 0.175 0.399 -0.761 -0.233 -0.422 -0.532 -0.048 1
aprmrkd 32 14.75 8.24 2.11 35.78 0.478 -0.178 0.167 0.224 -0.603 -0.086 -0.326 -0.338 0.471 0.845 1




price initial rds monopoly br pat kh cr
1981-84 32 12.17 58.76 2.60 52.97 11.22 39.52 80.82 5.19
1985,86,89 32 10.37 69.60 3.33 50.28 14.82 43.29 75.61 4.62
1990-94 32 12.97 63.82 3.73 47.35 24.53 43.85 69.35 4.18
1995-98 32 14.10 61.01 3.79 38.78 26.51 43.77 68.58 5.84
Correlation matrix